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The Department of Defense (DOD) has been unable to 
complete a financial audit since the enactment of the 
Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, requiring periodic 
audits of all federal agencies.  With corporate accounting 
scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and Xerox fresh in 
America’s mind, Congress has given high priority to 
examining DOD’s financial management situation, their plans 
for improvement, and ensuring taxpayer money can be 
accounted for throughout the department.  This thesis will 
examine the root causes behind DOD’s perceived wasteful 
culture, failed attempts to remedy the situation, the top 
10 obstacles impeding proper financial management, and the 
outlook for attaining and passing an audit based on current 
strategy.  In addition, this thesis will analyze the 
complexity of DOD budget execution and why budgets are 
rarely executed as written.  With a slowing economy and 
other federal departments forced to do more with less, a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the status 
of financial management in the Department of Defense (DOD).  
DOD has been under intense scrutiny for several decades 
because of a perceived wasteful culture.  This thesis will 
examine the department’s current situation, the events 
leading to that situation and the outlook for the future.  
Congress’ most pressing concerns will be explored and the 
top 10 obstacles impeding proper financial management will 
be identified.  Testimony of DOD and the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) officials will be examined regarding the 
probability of proposed changes resulting in a long-term 
solution.  A secondary focus of this research will be to 
determine how effective DOD has been in the past in 
identifying financial management shortcomings and 
implementing solutions.  Budget and spending data will be 
analyzed to determine the extent execution turbulence 
affects financial management.  The issues will be addressed 
in terms of solvability, in both the short and the long 
term.  The research goal is to provide a survey of the 
horizon of financial management and budget execution for 
DOD.  A secondary goal is to determine the impact of 
problems and possible solutions.    
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1995, Department of Defense Inspector General 
Eleanor Hill testified before Congress that a turnaround in 
the Pentagon’s budgeting practices might be expected by the 
year 2000. Hundreds of auditors and tens of billions of 
dollars in recommended adjustments later, DOD's books 
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remain in shambles. To date, no major part of the Defense 
Department has ever passed the test of an independent 
audit. [Ref. 2:p. 2]  Congress has made DOD’s financial 
management situation a priority as years have gone by 
without tangible improvements.   
Franklin C. Spinney, Tactical Air Analyst for the 
Department of Defense, described the quandary for the 
Defense Department when speaking about current financial 
practices at the Pentagon.  He said: 
Both links are broken.  The historical books 
cannot pass the routine audits required by law 
and planning data systematically misrepresents 
the future consequences of current decisions.  
The double breakdown in these information links 
makes it impossible for decision makers to 
assemble the information needed to synthesize a 
coherent defense plan that is both accountable to 
the American people and responsive to the 
changing threats, opportunities and constraints, 
of an uncertain world. [Ref. 2:p. 3] 
Leaders on Capital Hill and at the Pentagon are in the 
midst of planning a financial reform effort they hope will 
yield a reformed and improved system.  Recent GAO reports 
and DOD self-studies have concurred the first step to an 
effective system is creating an architecture with 
integrated processes from end-to-end.  However, the 
financial management system that exists today is plagued by 
its own robustness and complexity.  Initial estimates for 
obtaining a clean audit are eight to ten years.  However, 
there is optimism attributed to the Secretary’s leadership 
and transformation agenda.  Others have attempted well-
intentioned programs in the past and momentum seems to 
exist for reform, but Congress wants to alleviate its 
  3 
concerns and ensure the momentum continues in the future to 
make the necessary cultural, systems, human capital, and 
other key changes to make successful reform a reality. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the primary financial management and budget 
execution problems facing DOD as seen by Congress and by 
DOD self-study?  
2.  Secondary Research Questions 
• How does DOD explain the persistence of these 
problems? 
• Is there a correlation in budget execution 
turbulence between various categories? 
• What strategy does GAO recommend to correct 
problems with the DOD’s financial management 
system? 
• What is the probability that DOD’s reform plan 
will succeed? 
• What types of incentives, penalties or rewards 
can Congress impose to help sustain DOD’s 
efforts?  
D.  SCOPE 
This research analyzes Department of Defense financial 
management since 1989.  The scope of this research sought 
the perspective of the Department of Defense, members of 
Congress, the General Accounting Office and independent 
analysts.  Data analysis focused on Department of the Navy 
budgeting and spending trends since February 1999.  
E.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research was divided into six 
steps: (1) review of pertinent literature, (2) data 
collection, (3) analysis of government documents, (4) data 
analysis, (5) identification of the Top 10 critical 
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obstacles for reform, (6) development of conclusions about 
current status.  
• Literature Review: A review of literature and 
legal support references relating to the federal 
budget formulation and execution process.  This 
research included a literature search of books, 
magazine articles, journals, World Wide Web, DOD 
references, and other library information 
resources. 
• Data Collection: Compiled Department of the Navy 
appropriation and budget execution data from 
February 1999 to August 2002.   
• Government Documents: Conducted a review of 
General Accounting Office reports and 
Congressional hearing testimony. 
• Analysis of Data: Selected an account from three 
different categories for trend analysis and 
turbulence determination. 
• Top 10 List: From literature review, data 
collection, government documents, and analysis of 
data; compiled Top 10 list of issues critical for 
reform. 
• Conclusions: From previous analysis, determined 
the probability of DOD reaching an auditable 
status with their current strategy. 
F.  ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a brief background of DOD budget 
execution and spending turbulence.  Starting with a list of 
legislation providing the legal framework for budget 
execution, it then provides a comparison of budget data 
between three accounts from separate categories to make 
conclusions about budget turbulence. 
Chapter III discusses Congressional priorities and 
failed attempts at reform in the past two decades.  Next, 
is a list of the Top 10 problems with the financial 
management environment with specific examples of each. 
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Chapter IV identifies the perspective of GAO and DOD 
regarding the status and outlook of the Defense 
Department’s financial management.  Specific 
recommendations will be cited for future strategy and keys 
to success. 
Chapter V presents a comparative analysis and 
conclusions.  
G.  BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study provides a synopsis of the current DOD 
financial management situation, how it evolved to what it 
is today and the prospects for the future.   It also 
details the difficulty encountered in DOD budget execution 
and why it is difficult to budget and spend in the current 
system.  A top 10 list of problems is identified, as well 
as analysis of the likelihood of current initiatives 
achieving intended goals.   
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II. DOD BUDGET EXECUTION AND SPENDING TURBULENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense had $373 billion in budget 
authority for fiscal year 2002, the majority of which was 
funded by United States taxpayers.  With corporate 
accounting debacles such as Enron, WorldCom and Xerox fresh 
in America’s mind, the question confronting the United 
States Congress is- Can the Department of Defense account 
for every dollar it spends?  The answer, as of November 
2002, is no.  DOD is universally perceived as having 
ineffective accounting methods and as the segment of the 
federal government most susceptible to financial waste and 
abuse.  This is evidenced by their inability to receive a 
clean audit since the enactment of the Accounting and 
Auditing Act of 1950, requiring periodic audits of all 
federal agencies.  Further amplifying their difficulties is 
the inability to adhere to the basic financial reporting 
requirements for federal agencies established by the Chief 
Financial Officer’s Act of 1990.  DOD has attempted to fix 
the department’s financial management shortcomings for the 
past half century, but the same general problems persist.  
In 1995, Department of Defense Comptroller John Hamre 
promised a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee he would, 
“Take comprehensive action to sort out the accounting 
mess.” [Ref. 1:p. 2]  Seven years later, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld is making similar statements.  Congress 
wants to know how DOD leaders plan to make fundamental 
changes to the department’s financial architecture to 
assure the American people that their tax dollars are being 
spent appropriately. 
  8 
 
B.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF BUDGET EXECUTION     
The United States Constitution provides the basis for 
all aspects of DOD spending.  Congress has also passed 
specific rules and regulations throughout the years to help 
ensure proper budget execution.  Specific legislation 
includes:   
1. Article 1, Section 9, United States Constitution 
States, “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” and upon 
which the apportionment and Treasury warrant is based.  The 
Office of Management of Budget (OMB) apportions this amount 
to DOD, who delegates to subordinates the authority to 
incur a specific amount of obligations.  Clause 7 requires 
that a regular statement and account of the receipts and 
expenditures of all public money shall be published from 
time to time. 
2.  Title 31, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 
1301 
“Application of appropriations.”  Restricts the 
expenditure of funds to the purposes for which they are 
appropriated.   
3.  Title 31, U.S.C., Sections 1341, 1342 
“The Anti-Deficiency Act,” states no federal officer 
or employee may authorize Government obligations or 
expenditures in advance of or in excess of an 
appropriation, unless otherwise authorized by law, and that 
no Federal officer or employee may accept voluntary 
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4.  Title 31, U.S.C., Section 1514   
“Administrative Division of Apportionments,” requires 
establishment of administrative control of funds designed 
to restrict obligations against an appropriation or fund to 
the amount of the apportionment or reapportionment, and the 
agency to be able to fix responsibility for the creation of 
any obligation in excess of an apportionment or 
reapportionment. 
5.  Title 31, U.S.C., Section 1517  
“Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures,” prohibits 
making or authorizing expenditures or obligations in excess 
of available apportioned funds, or amount permitted by 
regulations under Section 1514, and requires the reporting 
of violations of this section to the President and the 
Congress. 
6. The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950    
Defines the legal basis for issuance of appropriation 
warrants by the Secretary of the Treasury, who is 
responsible for the system of central accounting and 
financial reporting for the government as a whole. 
7.  Chief Financial Officer’s Act of 1990 
This Act established the legal framework for improving 
financial management in the Federal Government.  Signed 
into law in January 1990, the Act represented the most 
aggressive and comprehensive financial management 
legislation in the previous forty years.  Recognizing that 
the government’s antiquated financial structure was failing 
to provide decision makers timely, reliable and all-
inclusive information, Congress designed the Act to lay a 
foundation for complete reform.  It also established a 
leadership structure, provided for long-range planning, 
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required audited financial statements, and strengthened 
accountability reporting.     
In the twelve years since the signing of the CFO Act, 
DOD has never been close to compliance.  In April 2001, the 
DOD Financial Management Study Group completed their review 
of their progress concerning financial management 
transformation.  They observed that, “DOD was unable to 
produce timely, reliable, and relevant financial reports on 
a regular basis, and was clearly unable to meet the 
requirements of the CFO Act of 1990.” [Ref. 2]  Defining 
the terms, “timely” is self-evident, “reliable” refers to 
accurate numbers that are confirmable by audit, and 
“relevant” means the task force had difficultly identifying 
the significance of much of the data provided to managers.  
It is an axiom in management that if you cannot measure it, 
you cannot manage it.  The CFO Act and related legislation 
have not solved the financial management problems, but have 
succeeded in bringing the financial reporting problems of 
most federal agencies, including DOD’s, to light.  DOD now 
has the Congressional attention to provide the missing 
scrutiny needed to help correct their financial practices.   
C.  BUDGET EXECUTION COMPARISON 
Building and executing the Defense Department’s budget 
is difficult business.  DOD seldom executes the document as 
written.  It contains thousands of line items in broad and 
complex categories ranging from Procurement to Military 
Construction.  A basic assumption about DOD budget 
execution is individual accounts can be classified as 
either stable or highly unpredictable.  In reality, even 
the perceived stable accounts do not perform in a 
predictable manner. For example, Congress approves Military 
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Personnel accounts on an annual basis and the 
appropriations rarely change in the middle of the year, yet 
outlays do not follow a strict schedule.  This chapter will 
illustrate the turbulence inherent in managing DOD budgets 
and examine the instability of three individual accounts 
from fiscal year 2000, the Military Personnel Navy (MPN) 
account, the Air Operations account from the Operations and 
Maintenance Navy (OMN) appropriation, and an appropriation 
for the LPD 17 program in Ship Building and Conversion Navy 
(SCN).  
1.  Military Personnel Navy Account 
It would be reasonable for the public to assume an 
account for military personnel would not fluctuate 
significantly from month to month.  The MPN account 
provides authorization for standard line items such as 
Basic Pay, Housing Allowances, Retirement Pay, Hazardous 
Duty Pay, Basic Allowance for Subsistence, Enlistment 
Bonuses, and Clothing Allowances.  The following (Table 1) 
is a chart of the Grand Total MPN account from September 
1999 through October 2000.  The first column labeled “APPN 
YTD” contains the amount of money Congress appropriated to 
DOD to incur an obligation year to date.  The second column 
labeled “OBLIG YTD” is the amount that DOD officials have 
obligated year to date in contracts that legally bind the 
government to a future expenditure.  The third column 
labeled “DISB YTD” is the total outlay from the Treasury 
for the fiscal year in execution of the account’s 
obligations.  The fourth column labeled “% OBL Per MN” is 
the percentage of new obligations incurred during the month 
compared to the total for the fiscal year.  The last column 
labeled “% DISB Per MN” is the percentage of actual money 
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spent during the month compared to the total for the fiscal 
year.  
 








Sep-99 16909133 16903230 15681715   
Oct-99 16814377 1530961 1450599 8.76  8.30 
Nov-99 16831427 2889514 2825433 7.77 7.87 
Dec-99 17290760 4315097 4153254 8.16 7.60 
Jan-00 17310972 5712740 4875431 8.0 4.13 
Feb-00 17330725 7151770 6253722 8.24 7.89 
Mar-00 17362469 8603070 8381684 8.31 12.18 
Apr-00 17379878 10053077 9099385 8.29 4.11 
May-00 17397810 11517176 10534485 8.38 8.21 
Jun-00 17418949 13012091 12699296 8.56 12.39 
Jul-00 17392367 14510662 13406883 8.58 4.05 
Aug-00 17420989 16102110 14948983 9.11 8.83 
Sep-00 17472900 17434859 17172535 7.63 12.73 
Oct-00 17728554 1669236 798025   
Total FY 
2002 
   99.78 98.49 
   
Table 1.   Grand Total MPN (In Thousands of 
Dollars) [From: Ref. 3]  
 
Although pay and allowance figures are approved 
annually, the fiscal year 2000 MPN account demonstrates 
turbulence as the appropriated amount changes every month.  
It also shows that budgets do not always continually 
increase.  The appropriation went down between June and 
July, as well as during the transition into fiscal year 
2001.  The table also reveals that the monthly percentage 
of obligations range between 7.6% and 9.1% for the year.  
These numbers appear to support an orderly scenario, yet no 
one month is the same as another and .03% of what is 
budgeted never becomes obligated. 
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Similarly, disbursement numbers display a discernable 
pattern.  Total quarterly spending gradually rises from 
23.73% in the first to 25.58% in the fourth.  Additionally, 
after a consistent October through December where 
disbursements stayed within .7% of each other, monthly 
patterns began to appear.  The remainder of the year 
yielded an average spending of 4.10% for the first months 
of each quarter, 8.31% for second months and 12.43% for the 
last months.  Figure 1 displays the relationship between 
obligations and disbursements.  The top (diamond) line is 
the total obligations while the bottom (square) line is the 
total disbursement.  The account behaves predictably as 
there is a steady upward slope in obligations, but total 













































Figure 1.   MPN Obligation versus Disbursement 
[From: Ref. 3] 
 
Similar to obligation patterns, no single month’s 
disbursements matched another and 1.51% of obligations were 
never disbursed.      
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2.  Air Ops Account 
The account designated “AG 1A” in the Navy budget 
refers to Air Operations and resides in the Operations and 
Maintenance category.  Individual line items include 
Mission and Other Flight Operations, Fleet Air Training, 
Aircraft Depot Maintenance, and Safety Support.  
Traditionally, this account has been the subject of much 
budget debate because the large expense to maintain 
aircraft is weighed against the importance of maintaining 
pilot proficiency.  The flight hours and aircraft 
maintenance programs become targets of budget cuts and 
mission readiness increases during both peace and wartime.  
The Table 2 lists the AG 1A account for fiscal year 2000 
and a month before and after.  Differences from the MPN 
table previously listed are the columns labeled “Revised,” 
and “APPN vs REV.”   The Revised column contains the 
dollars appropriated and includes any reprogramming, 
supplementals and rescissions.  “Reprogramming” occurs when 
there is a change in the allocation of resources in a 
budget.  A “supplemental” is a budget request submitted 
separately to Congress and is generally related to 
unforeseen circumstances such as funding for disaster 
relief.  A “rescission” accommodates changing priorities, 
helping to offset new spending with cancellations of 
funding previously made available.  The “APPN vs REV” 
column is a comparison of the difference between the 







Obligated Disb APPN 
vs REV 
Sep-99 3741527 4163821 4160307 3070814 11.29 
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Oct-99 3402490 3402490 345635 167538 0.00 
Nov-99 3402490 3895179 794859 367754 14.48 
Dec-99 3402490 3814776 1095921 696639 12.12 
Jan-00 3402490 3922129 1498939 986682 15.27 
Feb-00 3402490 4036298 1800733 1374413 18.63 
Mar-00 3402490 4040249 2137559 1820672 18.74 
Apr-00 3402490 4043529 2637064 2316700 18.84 
May-00 3402490 4037861 2905024 2771119 18.67 
Jun-00 3402490 4064057 3160359 2664554 19.44 
Jul-00 3402490 4151047 3625119 2945082 22.00 
Aug-00 3402490 4149634 3902857 3268183 21.96 
Sep-00 3402490 4144233 4136944 3635864 21.80 
Oct-00 4275064 4263635 627158 140842 -0.27 
Table 2.   AG 1A Air Ops (In Thousands of Dollars) 
[From: Ref. 3] 
 
Unlike the MPN account, the Air Ops appropriation remains 
stable throughout the fiscal year.  However, the revised 
level varies significantly.  Figure 2 displays a comparison 
between the budgeted, approved and revised totals for 
fiscal year 2000.  There were no revisions for October, but 
there was significant activity in the remaining months as 
revisions added anywhere from 12.12% to 22% to original 
appropriations.      















Figure 2.   AG 1A Air Ops Appropriation  
 [From: Ref. 3]  
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Figure 3 compares the Air Account’s cumulative monthly 
revised, obligated, and disbursed totals.  There is a 
distinct upward trend, but there is one exception as the 
amount decreases between April and May.  Additionally, the 
total amount executed exceeds the original appropriation 
for the year, while 12% of obligations are never spent for 
the fiscal year.    













Revised Obligated Gross Dis
 
Figure 3.   AG 1A Air Ops Appropriation  
 [From: Ref. 3] 
 
3.  LPD 17 Advanced Procurement Account  
The first platform in the Navy’s new generation of 
Amphibious Assault Ships, the LPD 17 SAN ANTONIO Class, was 
approved by Congress on 17 December 1996.  However, due to 
design complications and construction delays, the 
completion date has been pushed back from September 2002 to 
an estimated date of November 2004. [Ref. 6]  By focusing 
on a specific LPD 17 advanced procurement account; 
designated 99/03 1611 in the Shipbuilding and Conversion 
Navy (SCN) section, the difficulties of planning and 
executing an unpredictable budget become clear.  The 
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following table lists appropriated, obligated and 
disbursement numbers for fiscal year 2000, as well as the 
last months of the quarter from September 1999 through and 
including August 2002.  The column labeled “APPN vs OBL” 
reveals the percentage of the appropriation that became 
obligated.  The far right column labeled “OBL vs DISB” is 
the percentage of the obligated amount that was spent.  
 




Sep-99 636878 357023 23404 56.06 6.56 
Oct-99 279855 1364 1345 0.49 98.61 
Nov-99 279855 4904 3513 1.75 71.64 
Dec-99 279855 10559 4570 3.77 43.28 
Jan-00 275900 13808 3607 5.00 26.12 
Feb-00 275900 22843 4690 8.28 20.53 
Mar-00 275900 25309 10868 9.17 42.94 
Apr-00 275900 28457 12421 10.31 43.65 
May-00 275900 38121 15203 13.82 39.88 
Jun-00 275900 46694 18737 16.92 40.13 
Jul-00 275900 49506 21662 17.94 43.76 
Aug-00 275900 50816 23616 18.42 46.48 
Sep-00 275862 53038 26172 19.23 49.35 
Oct-00 222824 920 2172 0.41 236.09 
Dec-00 222824 9346 8826 4.19 94.44 
Mar-01 222824 25527 19622 11.46 76.87 
Jun-01 222824 30453 32112 13.67 105.45 
Sep-01 222824 45096 55303 20.24 122.63 
Dec-01 177727 7609 21108 4.28 277.41 
Mar-02 177727 15774 46934 8.88 297.54 
Jun-02 177727 97186 91043 27.11 156.26 
Aug-02 177727 97925 107320 55.10 109.59 
Table 3.   LPD 17 99/03 Appropriation (In 
Thousands of Dollars) [From: Ref. 3] 
 
The table reveals the LPD 17 program had significant 
funding in fiscal year 99, but delays resulted in 
disbursement of only 6.56% of obligated funds in September 
1999.  Appropriations were cut by 56% for fiscal year 2000, 
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but delays persisted.  Not until tangible progress began in 
the ship’s construction toward the end of the year did 
obligations and disbursements begin to approach 
appropriated levels.  Figure 4 depicts the turmoil delays 
can cause with executing a budget of an unstable program as 
it compares the total appropriation (Series 1), obligation 
(Series 2) and disbursement (Series 3) for fiscal year 
2000.    


















Figure 4.   LPD 17 Appropriation versus Obligation 
versus Disbursement [From: Ref. 3] 
 
The LPD 17 account displays the difficulty of planning 
for a developing program.  There are additional obstacles 
because this is the first ship in the class.  Once the 
design is formalized and proper test and evaluation are 
conducted, budgeting and spending will become far more 
predictable.  Historical data reveals the obligation and 
outlay percentages are not far from the median for SCN 
appropriations.  SCN accounts average 63% of the 
appropriation being obligated during the base year, and 14% 
the year after.  The LPD 17 99/03 account does not deviate 
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significantly from the norm as it obligated 56% and 19% 
respectively.     The outlays reveal similar statistics, as 
the average outlay during the base year is 7.1%, while the 
LPD 17 appropriation yielded a 6.56% in September 1999. 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A sampling of budgeting and spending data from three 
broad categories reveals the immense difficulty inherent in 
DOD budget execution.  Accounts are hard to manage because 
appropriations get revised, revisions rarely become 
completely obligated, and obligations are seldom fully 
disbursed.  This leads to budgets that are arduous to 
predict and even more taxing to execute.     
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III. CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITIES   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Of utmost concern to lawmakers is ensuring DOD is able 
to get control of its financial systems and increase 
accountability.  With $368 billion of the $773 billion (48 
percent) of the federal government’s fiscal year 2003 
discretionary funds going to defense, Congress’s wants to 
certify that all funds are spent wisely.  In comparison, 
the Department of Education will receive only $50.3 billion 
and the Department of Agriculture is appropriated $19.8 
billion of federal discretionary money.  With a slowing 
economy and other departments forced to do more with less, 
Congressional representatives have given DOD’s financial 
situation the highest priority.  A more efficient financial 
structure could potentially save billions, freeing money 
for other agencies. 
B.  ATTEMPTS AT REFORM SINCE 1989 
On September 10, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld announced a broad initiative intended to 
“transform the way the department works and what it works 
on,” which he estimated could save five percent of DOD’s 
budget, or about $15 billion to $18 billion annually. [Ref. 
4:p. 1]  With the terrorist attacks the following day on 
September 11th, departmental priorities were forced to shift 
to the War on Terror, but it made the federal government’s 
short and long-term budget challenges more important than 
ever.  Transforming business operations was seen as 
imperative to get the most from every dollar appropriated.  
As Gregory D. Kutz, director of Financial Management and 
Assurance for the General Accounting Office, testified: 
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Even before the events of September 11, increased 
globalization, changing security threats, and 
rapid technological advances were prompting 
fundamental changes in the environment in which 
DOD operates.  These trends place a premium on 
increasing strategic planning, enhancing results 
orientation, ensuring effective accountability, 
maintaining transparency, and using integrated 
approaches. [Ref. 4:p. 2]  
The challenge facing DOD is immense.  The past half-century 
is littered with failed attempts by the department to gain 
control of its finances.  In 1995, the General Accounting 
Office identified DOD on its high-risk list, because of the 
department’s failure to protect assets from fraud, waste 
and abuse.  One example; GAO recently uncovered millions of 
dollars erroneously charged to government credit cards 
including personal items, trips, and even plastic surgery. 
[Ref. 5:p. 5]     
Congress has continually sought ways to legislatively 
improve control over DOD spending.  For example, in 1990, 
Congress passed a law governing the use of appropriation 
accounts because they found DOD spent hundreds of millions 
of dollars for purposes they had not approved.  The law 
specified that five years after the expiration of a fixed-
term appropriation, the appropriation account be closed and 
all remaining balances canceled. [Ref. 7]  However, the 
problems persisted.  DOD records from fiscal years 1997 
through 2001 showed that it made approximately $12 billion 
of adjustments affecting closed appropriation accounts, 
including $1.9 billion as recently as fiscal year 2001.  
Further research found that DOD had made over $615 million 
of illegal and otherwise improper adjustments to closed 
appropriation accounts during fiscal year 2000. [Ref. 7]         
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The Department of Defense has initiated several reform 
campaigns since the first Bush administration reform 
designed to overhaul the existing systems and realize 
significant savings, but they failed to achieve intended 
goals.  These programs include: 
1. The Corporate Information Management (CIM) 
Initiative   
The CIM began in 1989 and leaders forecast savings of 
billions of dollars through streamlined operations and 
standard information systems.  CIM was expected to reform 
all DOD’s functional areas-including finance, procurement, 
material management, and human resources-through 
consolidation, standardization, and integration of 
information systems.  DOD also expected CIM to replace 
approximately 2,000 duplicative systems.  Over the years, 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) has made numerous 
recommendations to improve CIM management, but these 
recommendations went largely unaddressed.  Instead, GAO 
reported, ”DOD spent billions of dollars with little sound 
analytical justification.” [Ref. 8]  As of 1997, DOD spent 
nearly $20 billion on the initiative and the expected 
savings had yet to materialize.  The initiative was 
eventually abandoned. 
2. The Defense Business Operations Fund    
In October 1991, DOD established a new entity, the 
Defense Business Operations Fund by consolidating nine 
existing industrial and stock funds and five other 
activities operated throughout DOD.  The fund was intended 
to bring greater visibility and management to the overall 
cost of carrying out certain critical DOD business 
operations.  However, the fund was plagued by management 
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problems.  In 1996, DOD announced the fund’s elimination.  
In its place, they established four working capital funds.  
These new working capital funds inherited their 
predecessor’s operational and financial reporting problems.   
3. The Defense Reform Initiative (DRI)   
In announcing the DRI program in November 1997, 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that his goal was 
to “ignite a revolution in business affairs.”  DRI was a 
set of proposed actions aimed at improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s business operations, 
particularly in the areas that had been long standing 
problems-including financial management.  In July 2000, GAO 
reported that while DRI got off to a good start and made 
progress in implementing many of the component initiatives; 
it did not meet expected time frames and goals.  With the 
turnover of administrations, the program lost momentum and 
the initiatives have not been pursued since. 
C. TOP 10 PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
ENVIRONMENT 
It appears ironic today, but at one time, the 
Department of Defense was the leader in adapting new 
financial management concepts for government agencies.    
It’s Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was 
widely emulated in other federal departments, and by 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson mandated government-wide PPBS 
implementation.  However, other agency officials eventually 
found the system difficult to relate proposed programs with 
intended results. [Ref. 13,p. 64]  Soon thereafter, DOD was 
the only agency using the system.  The uncontrolled 
proliferation of non-standard systems and processes for 
performing both financial and non-financial functions 
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eventually created a host of problems that continue to 
plague the department.  Those include an inability to 
consistently produce either useful day-to-day financial 
information or commercial type financial statements.  A 
plethora of factors combined to create the enormous 
accounting problems DOD faces today.  The following is a 
consolidated list of the top 10 issues compiled throughout 
this thesis research that have contributed to the problem 
and require addressing if a DOD hopes to reach a solution.   
1. Complexity of Current Financial Structure 
The financial management difficulties at DOD have 
become progressively worse over time.  Lack of 
standardization across the department has caused previously 
reliable systems to evolve into a complex business network 
that is highly prone to errors.  What remains is a 
structure where multiple systems perform similar tasks, the 
same data are stored in multiple systems and, in this 
technological age, much data entry is manual. [Ref. 2:p. 
25]  The heart of the problem is an antiquated business 
structure. As David R. Warren of the General Accounting 
Office stated in July 2002: 
The business processes within the Department of 
Defense largely were developed as it relates to 
the logistics area in the 60s and 70s, and at 
that time, they were quite good systems, and 
based on modern business and practice at the 
time.  However, over time, they have evolved and 
have not modernized.  So what you’re faced with 
is what is often referred to as a brute force 
system.  It gets the job done but in many 
respects, is very inefficient. [Ref. 5:p, 15]   
The sheer size of DOD has spawned thousands of non-
standard business systems.  The failure to centrally 
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modernize the financial architecture forced individual 
commands to create their own solutions.  As of June 2002, 
DOD identified 1,127 different financial and non-financial 
feeder systems, with approximately 3,500 interfaces 
providing information.  As Tina Jonas, Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Financial Management testified in 
June 2002:  
What this illustrates is that it is impossible to 
be accurate or timely with this type of business 
environment.  People wonder why we can’t get a 
clean audit statement…The further you get out 
from one of the core systems, accounting systems, 
the more likely it is that an error will have 
been made. [Ref. 2:p. 8] 
The plethora of systems has also resulted in difficulty 
training new personnel and an immense problem of accurately 
tracking costs throughout the department. 
In 2002, the General Accounting Office conducted a 
study to investigate the accounting paths of two items.  
The first item, a chemical-biological protective garment 
called JSList (Joint Service, Lightweight, integrated suit 
technology), was selected because it is unique to DOD.  The 
second item, a commercial computer obtained with a DOD 
purchase card.  The results reveal a sample of the 
complexity of the current DOD financial structure.      
With regard to the JSList, GAO traced 128 processing 
steps to acquire, control inventory, and pay for the item. 
[Ref. 5:p. 13]   Gregory Kutz of the GAO observed: 
The chem-bio suit inventory process was 
characterized by stove-piped, non-integrated 
systems with numerous costly error prone manual 
processes.  Of the 128 processing steps that we  
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identified, 100 or about 78 percent were manual. 
[Ref. 5:p. 7]  
The commercial computer case study impressed GAO 
members with the advantages provided by the DOD purchase 
card.  They noted, “The system was mostly automated and 
provided the flexibility to acquire goods and services on 
the day needed.” [Ref. 5:p. 8]  However, GAO discovered 
that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
still received monthly credit card statements mainly by 
mail or fax.  Personnel were required to manually reenter 
each line of the purchase card statement.  Manual entry of 
data is required because DFAS does not have the ability to 
accept the credit card data electronically.  This practice 
is costly because there is a $17 per line processing fee 
per manual transaction.  Analysis of the Navy monthly 
purchase card statement revealed 228 such transactions, 
resulting in DFAS charging the Navy almost $3,900 in extra 
processing fees.  In contrast, both Wal-Mart and Sears make 
extensive use of electronic data transmissions within their 
internal systems and suppliers. [Ref. 5:p. 8]   
In an effort to better manage more complex procurement 
transactions, the Defense Contract Management Agency runs a 
system called Mechanization of Contract Administration 
Services (MOCAS).  The MOCAS System is capable of 
processing contracts and receiving invoices electronically, 
with the MOCAS manual rate approximately $20 more per 
invoice than the electronic rate.  However, to receive the 
reduced electronic rate, both the contract and the invoice 
must be received electronically. [Ref. 5:p. 33]  DFAS uses 
MOCAS to pay financing and deliverable invoices, but in the 
example of JSList, DFAS still received only seventy four 
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percent of the invoices electronically.  Therefore, not 
utilizing a worthwhile system to its full potential may be 
costing DOD millions of dollars a year.      
There are also examples of laziness within individual 
services.  Representative Kucinich sites an example where a 
simple consolidation of line items, coupled with electronic 
processing instead of manual data entry could have saved a 
significant amount of money.  On one purchase card 
statement, a sample of line items read: vendor, Staples, 
amount of purchase $4.37, processing fee $17.13; vendor, 
Culligan Water Conditioning, amount of purchase $5.50, 
processing fee $17.13, vendor, Office Depot, amount of 
purchase $8.59, processing fee $17.13. [Ref. 5:p. 36]  Not 
only were the processing fees more than double the amount 
of the individual purchases, the manual entry charge would 
have been only $6.96 if sent electronically. 
Contract overpayment is another product of the 
complexity of the financial structure. The lack of a 
standard accounting system to track costs throughout a 
program’s life cycle has resulted in an unusually long time 
to calculate the total cost of ownership of a system or 
equipment.  As Steven Friedman, Chairman of the Defense 
Financial Management Study Group stated in June 2002: 
These systems that grew up over decades, hundreds 
and hundreds of feeder systems, typically were at 
the service level or lower, were old.  Roughly 80 
percent of the systems were not in control of the 
DOD’s central financial management.  These feeder 
systems funneled information to DOD’s central 
financial and accounting system.  Over the years, 
standardization and compatibility had not been 
mandated, these really couldn’t speak to each 
other. [Ref. 2:p. 5]  
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The GAO states that for fiscal years 1994 through 1999, 
contractors returned over $1.2 billion of overpayments to 
DOD.  That figure represents only accounts that have been 
resolved.  Based on an Inspector General Report, $1.2 
trillion in transactions cannot accurately be accounted for 
by the Department of Defense. [Ref. 5:p. 14]  
2. Transient Nature of DOD Leadership 
The sheer size of the task of fixing the DOD financial 
structure requires long-term commitment that has proven 
difficult to accomplish in the Department of Defense.  New 
administrations typically appoint their own leadership, and 
often they have significantly different philosophies from 
their predecessors and take the department in an opposite 
direction.  Further complicating the process is a Pentagon 
estimate of eight to ten years until a clean audit may be 
attained. [Ref. 2:p. 3]  Influential companies such as 
General Electric, Pfizer, and Boeing, all identified 
leadership as the most important factor in making cultural 
change and establishing effective financial management.  
Sustaining top management commitment to performance goals 
is a particular challenge for DOD.  The department’s top 
political appointees have averaged only a 1.7 year tenure, 
hindering long term planning and follow through. [Ref. 2:p. 
25]  The lack of a champion for long term reform has 
contributed to the failure of previous initiatives.  
The high turnover rate is also counterproductive.  The 
scenario creates a cycle where new administrators are 
forced to buy into the organization’s culture and methods 
from the start if they hope make a difference in their 
short time.  Then once they start to grasp system dynamics 
and begin to generate ideas to improve the process, it is 
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time for a new appointee to take over.  As Franklin 
Spinney, Tactical Air Analyst for DOD, puts it, “We don’t 
have the kind of corporate memory, so a lot of people come 
in and they go along with this stuff in the short term, 
they don’t really get the big picture until they leave.” 
[Ref. 2:p. 29] 
The turnover also has a direct affect on the attitude 
of the long-term employees.  Speaking to the lack of 
continuity in this effort, Stephen Friedman testified: 
If people there in the Defense Department believe 
this is a flavor of the month and that their 
bosses are going to be leaving in—whatever the 
actuarially measurable time is—a year and a half 
for senior people and then this will not be a 
continuing priority, you will not have the 
sustained effort. [Ref. 2:p. 11]   
3. Lack of Consequences, Incentives and Rewards 
One of the main obstacles preventing significant 
financial reform is a pervasive lack of personal 
consequences, incentives and rewards.  The stereotypical 
government employee is a person who does just enough to get 
by and is very hard to fire.  The financial management 
problems of DOD will take significant effort and innovation 
to correct, however, experts contend the current structure 
does not provide sufficient motivation for employees to 
enact change.  Comparing managers in the Defense Department 
with those in the private sector, Stephen Friedman states: 
If you looked at a manager’s incentives, he 
hasn’t gotten any material bonus for doing better 
work.  It’s hard to measure whether he’s in fact, 
done better work.  It’s hard for him to discharge 
an employee that he considers to be incompetent, 
and then at the end when he looks at it, there 
aren’t the incentives to really stick your neck 
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out and do anything other than manage the budget. 
[Ref. 2:p. 11]    
There is also a lack of penalties in the current 
structure.  The nature of the defense industry makes it 
difficult to impose a monetary penalty on the Department 
because it could adversely affect national security.  Rep. 
Kucinich states: 
I do not believe the Department of Defense will 
fix this broken, unsustainable system on its own.  
What motivation does it have?  Despite its 
routinely dreadful performance, Congress almost 
never rejects a Pentagon request for more money.  
The time has come for Congress to treat the 
Department of Defense as the market treats any 
commercial enterprise.  Just as investors 
withhold their supply of capital to a company 
that fails to meet its expectations, Congress 
must refuse to supply additional funds to the 
Pentagon until its books are in order.  If 
Congress keeps appropriating more and more money, 
despite these horrendous practices, what’s the 
incentive for the Pentagon to reform? [Ref. 2:p. 
3]  
While it is presently politically unrealistic for Congress 
to withhold funds from defense with the ongoing war, Rep. 
Kucinich’s words echo the sentiment throughout the nation’s 
capital; the time is long overdue for DOD to fix the 
accounting problems. 
There is a long history of non-consequence that must 
be overcome as well.  In the civilian sector, companies 
have a sense of urgency to stay on top of their operations 
or place themselves in danger of going out of business.  
Representative Shays, who has been in Congress since the 
Reagan administration states, ”We need defense so we keep 
operating.  But if we knew that we couldn’t function unless 
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we got our act together, I think it (reform) would happen 
more quickly.” [Ref. 5:p. 6] 
The lack of personal accountability is the most 
disturbing for observers.  According to the GAO, the 
department lost 250,000 possibly defective JSList (Joint, 
Service, Lightweight integrated suit technology) garments, 
and could not track 1.2 million new suits, many of which 
were discovered being auctioned on the Internet for three 
dollars.  Commenting about those in charge, Representative 
Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) states, “Nothing happens to 
people.  On the purchase cards…little to nothing happens to 
people who misuse them, so there are absolutely no 
consequences.  DOD keeps failing us and we keep passing 
higher and higher budgets.” [Ref. 5:p. 25]   
There is also frustration in the fact that many of the 
people responsible for mistakes or in charge of 
implementing solutions do not pay the price for failure.  
The culture of the Department of Defense has no 
consequences for sloppiness.  Representative Tierney 
concluded about people in positions of responsibility who 
don’t perform: “What happens is they get promoted.  It’s 
not that nothing happens to them.  They get promoted by 
longevity being in there.” [Ref. 5:p. 26]  Again, while it 
is unrealistic to affect immediate change to the structure, 
the theme remains clear, the longer there are no 
consequences, the longer nothing happens. 
4. Cultural Resistance to Change 
The Department of Defense has learned over the years 
that even if they cannot pass an audit or make progress 
towards fixing an ineffective financial system, eventually 
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the organization will revert to the status quo.  The nature 
of the defense industry and its leadership’s non-commitment 
to reform efforts has bred a culture where DOD can 
virtually ignore changes it does not embrace.  Robert 
Lieberman spoke of the pessimism regarding implementing a 
new financial architecture for the department: 
The DOD might lack the discipline to stick to its 
blueprint.  The DOD does not have a good track 
record for deploying large information systems 
that fully meet user expectations, conform with 
applicable standards, stay within budget 
estimate, and meet planned schedules. [Ref. 2:p. 
24] 
GAO cited one of the reasons the Corporate Information 
Management (CIM) Program from the late 80’s failed was:  
There was resistance between Department of 
Defense components and a lack of sustained 
commitment to the program because some military 
departments did not want to participate in 
corporate information management, believing their 
financial management systems were superior to 
that which was proposed by the CIM. [Ref. 2:p. 
17]   
This attitude contributed to the proliferation of stovepipe 
systems that has allowed the services and DOD agencies to 
develop redundant solutions to business needs. 
Additionally, a defiant culture causes resistance to 
conforming to basic internal control programs.  For 
example, when DOD attempted to improve the credit card 
payment program, Gregory Kutz, GAO’s Director of Financial 
Management and Assurance, stated: 
There is nothing wrong with the system; people 
simply are not following the controls in many 
cases that are in place.  We’re paying monthly 
credit card bills with nobody actually reviewing 
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the bill, so we find ourselves paying for things 
the government shouldn’t actually be paying for…I 
think there’s a lot of people that are probably 
trying to wait this out and hope that this too 
will pass. [Ref. 2:p. 37]   
5. Low Ball Gaming Strategy 
The gaming strategy of both planners and contractors 
has contributed to DOD’s current financial situation.  The 
practice of frontloading, where cost estimates are low-
balled in projected long term weapons cost in the out years 
of production, is a political tool to get programs 
approved.  This is followed by what Franklin Spinney calls, 
the Political Engineering Process.  He says it is aimed at 
spreading the production base around the country to build 
constituent pressure to support the program.  
Representative Kucinich observes, “The contention is that 
once the out years are reached and the true costs of 
production become evident, there is no longer the political 
will to cancel the program.” [Ref. 2:p. 29]  
Low-ball cost estimates have severe ramifications 
throughout the defense industry.  Franklin Spinney notes: 
Biased numbers hide the future consequences of 
current policy decisions, permitting too many 
programs to get stuffed into the out years of the 
long-range budget plan.  This sets the stage for 
unaffordable budget bow waves, repeating costs—
cycles of cost growth and procurement stretch-
out, decreasing rates of modernization in older 
weapons, shrinking forces, and continual pressure 
to bail out the self-destructing modernization 
program by robbing the readiness accounts. [Ref. 
2:p. 10-11]  
For example, the actual cost of an F/A-18 became twice as 
much as predicted when it went into full production. [Ref. 
2]  Because of mis-estimations of unit costs, production 
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rates become lower than anticipated.  This leads to a lower 
replacement rate, meaning not enough equipment is purchased 
in a timely manner to replace the older equipment.  
Therefore, there is an increase in the average age of 
equipment, exponentially increasing operating costs.  
Ultimately, DOD is left with a shrinking force structure 
and potentially degraded readiness.   
DOD conducted a study of the C-130 program that 
revealed the costliness of the political engineering 
process.  Franklin Spinney reported the C-130 is a very 
simple airplane, built in an underutilized factory in 
Georgia.  What struck him is the air fuselage sections 
which could have been made in the same factory, were 
contracted out.  Upon asking an assembly line worker if it 
was cheaper to contract the other sections, he said, “No 
way at all.  We did this for political reasons.” [Ref. 2:p. 
32]  The cost has exponentially increased over the years.  
The cost to produce the C-130H in 1969 was approximately 
$11 million per plane.  By 1993, when the last C-130H was 
assembled, virtually identical to the first one and minus 
the cost of inflation, the price DOD paid was between $41 
and $42 million per copy. [Ref. 2:p. 32]  
Corporate America realizes it has to play the low-
balling game to stay competitive for defense dollars.  When 
asked about the frontloading practice, a corporate vice 
president of a major aerospace company said, “Look, we have 
to do this, because if we come clean, we won’t get the 
contract because everybody else is doing it.” [Ref. 2:p. 
30]  The dilemma compounds because the same competition 
exists inside the Pentagon.  Because there is constant 
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competition for resources, different factions fight with 
each other to make programs look the most appealing for 
their own survival.  
6. Inability to Benchmark off Successful Companies 
The DOD financial management questions the public 
often ponders are: why can’t they fix their financial 
structure simply by emulating civilian corporations?, and  
how can a clean audit be obtained in less than the eight to 
ten year estimate.  The answers are simply, DOD dwarfs the 
largest civilian companies in size and personnel, and 
defense is a unique business.  Major corporations in the 
United States have undergone similar financial 
restructuring recently with proportional periods.  For 
example, Gillette, Cisco and Hershey took between almost 
three to four years to finish their transformation.  
Lawrence Lanzillotta, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Management Reform, compared these changes with what 
confronts DOD stating, “These are individual efforts that 
took three years.  We are not happy with the complexity of 
the problem that we found (in DOD).” [Ref. 2:p. 9] 
DOD’s challenges are further complicated by the 
dramatic change in business organization landscape that 
occurred during the 1990’s.  John Coyle, an official from 
the Center for Supply Chain Research, identified numerous 
external forces affecting the supply chain.  First, today’s 
consumer is better educated, possesses greater income, and 
has much more information at his/her disposal.  Second, 
there is a tremendous amount of consolidation at the end of 
the supply chain in the hands of the retailers.  Third, is 
a change in government policy over a decade and a half with 
deregulation of major sectors that support business and 
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liberalization of trade.  Fourth, the exponential growth of 
globalization and global competitive forces impacting 
businesses; and lastly, technology dramatically changed the 
way businesses interact with each other and changed the way 
they could act theoretically with the consumer. [Ref. 5:p. 
17] 
Additionally, DOD does not possess the skill sets 
needed to accommodate the modern business procedures in the 
21st century.  Stephen Friedman cites, “People were trained 
in many systems that we are trying to move away from, and 
that we need more advanced degree professionals, more 
people who are trained in business practices.” [Ref. 2:p. 
12]  Those are part of the immediate difficulties and an 
additional complication toward reaching business 
transformation. 
7. Inadequate Inventory Control Procedures 
Inventory management is an area where DOD is deficient 
and civilian companies excel.  GAO identified the inventory 
management practices observed at Wal-Mart and Sears as 
differing sharply from those at DOD.  For example, both 
companies have standardization of data, little or no manual 
processing and systems that provide complete asset 
visibility.  Unlike DOD, Wal-Mart requires all components 
and subsidiaries to operate within its framework and does 
not foster stovepipe system development.  They also found 
Wal-Mart and Sears had visibility over inventory at the 
corporate distribution center and retail store level.  In 
contrast, DOD does not have visibility at the department, 
military service, or unit levels.  Integrated or interfaced 
systems and standardized data allowed both Sears and Wal-
Mart to specifically identify inventory items.  For 
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example, Wal-Mart’s headquarters staff was able to readily 
identify the number of 6.4-ounce tubes of brand name 
toothpaste that were available at a Fairfax, Virginia 
store.  Other information was also available, such as daily 
sales volume. [Ref. 5:p. 8]  However, a similar system does 
not exist at DOD and would be difficult to implement 
because of the complexity and size of the system.  
In DOD, there are warehouses full of items, each with 
a different National Stock Number (NSN).  During a GAO 
study, DFAS was handling 1.8 million unique items of 
inventory.  By comparison, the typical Home Depot carries 
about 70,000. [Ref. 5:p. 23]  The Defense Supply Center has 
over 22,000 customers, but many have non-compatible 
systems.  As John Coyle states about the requirements for 
reliable and timely information, “That requires that the 
systems interface with each other.” [Ref. 5:p. 23]  He also 
notes, ”The key to success in a company like Dell or Wal-
Mart is they do have inventory visibility.  They know where 
the inventory is up and down their supply chain.” [Ref. 
5:p. 18]  The problem is solvable, but the architecture 
must be fixed before a reliable inventory management system 
can be attained.  
The lack of a proven inventory control system has 
broad ramifications for DOD.  Being unable to accurately 
track items directly contributes to a lack of readiness, a 
culture of waste, and high susceptibility to fraud.  
According to a January 2001 GAO report, the Department of 
Defense cannot properly account for and report specifics on 
its weapons systems and support equipment.  They 
specifically cite examples of the Army not knowing the 
  39 
extent to which transport ship inventory had been lost or 
stolen, and the Navy being unable to account for more than 
$3 billion worth of shipped inventory, including some 
classified and sensitive items. [Ref. 5:p. 16-17]  The 
weaknesses in inventory control procedures prompted 
Representative Kucinich to pose the question, “What’s the 
possibility that material paid for by the American 
taxpayers is ending up in the hands of groups that may not 
be particularly friendly to the United States of America?” 
[Ref. 5:p. 17]  This unpleasant realization is a product of 
a long history of lackadaisical bookkeeping at DOD.  
The GAO’s JSList study also gives a brief glimpse of 
the scope of the problem facing DOD.  The Pentagon contract 
called for production of 4.4 million of the two-piece suits 
over a fourteen-year period at approximately $100 each. 
[Ref. 5:p. 5]  GAO uncovered the first incident of waste 
and abuse when they found 917 of the 1.2 million already 
purchased had been auctioned on the Internet for less than 
$3 each. [Ref. 5:p. 2]  They also found that some of the 
military units kept no records on the number of suits they 
possessed in inventory.  Others used dry erase boards to 
maintain their tally.  When told of these abuses, Douglas 
Bryce, Program Manager for JSList, said, “I had no idea 
that these re-sales were occurring.” [Ref. 5:p. 3]  Selling 
a needed item for a fraction of the cost, while at the same 
time buying more is the epitome of waste.    
A Congressional Committee hearing was held in 2000 
because of the same concerns about the Pentagon’s inventory 
control over JSList.  They discovered many suits were 
defective and needed to be removed from inventory.  As of 
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June 2002, the Pentagon had not been able to locate about 
250,000 of these defective suits. [Ref. 5:p. 4]  After 
initial issuance of equipment to commands, the Pentagon 
relinquishes responsibility to individual units.  Tracking 
methods at the command level are dominated by unique and 
largely manual systems.  Douglas Bryce observed, “They 
build an Excel spreadsheet or a Windows spreadsheet or some 
spreadsheet to track themselves internally, and what that 
creates is manual processes.” [Ref. 5:p. 39]   
Civilian companies often demonstrate how a 
standardized tracking system throughout an organization is 
imperative for conducting a proper recall.  For example, a 
health risk prompted Johnson & Johnson to recall Tylenol in 
the early 1990’s. [Ref. 5:p. 13]  Their system enabled 
tracking all the way to the retailer’s shelves, and 
resulted in swift action. 
The Department of Defense has demonstrated it has the 
capability to maintain tight inventory controls over 
priority items.  David Warren, GAO Director of the Defense 
Capabilities and Management Team, testified that sensitive 
items such as firearms are controlled in a much better 
manner than other items. [Ref. 5:p. 23]  The JSList may 
become a higher priority for the military in light of the 
United States contemplating possible military action 
against Iraq, a country said to have biological and 
chemical weapons. 
According to DOD’s records, there are presently about 
$200 billion dollars worth of inventory in various storage 
facilities. [Ref. 5]  Rep. Schakowsky states:  
DOD continually stores huge amounts of material 
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and equipment that has no use.  Additionally, the 
DOD process for tracking acquisitions and 
purchases is antiquated and seriously flawed.  
Oftentimes, the DOD can not find records of 
procurement, accounting, control and payment. 
[Ref. 5:p. 5]   
Another part of the problem is accountability for an 
item cannot be traced to one individual or organization.  
Douglas Bryce, testifies about procurement experience with 
JSList: 
There are twenty-four major steps to the process.  
Of those twenty-four steps, I have visibility of 
five that I can track through some type of system 
that I have access to or monitor or input to.  
That leaves nineteen that I do not.  Those who 
have control over the other nineteen include 
various agencies within DOD, which could be DFAS, 
it could be DLA, Department of Defense…Each one 
of those have processes and do things that I have 
very little visibility of as the program manager. 
[Ref. 5:p. 39]  
8. Lack of Fundamental Controls/Inaccurate Payments 
The turbulence of DOD contracts has caused inaccurate 
payments and potentially thousands of man-hours of 
financial reconciliation to correct errors.  DOD data for 
fiscal year 1999 showed that almost $1 of every $3 in 
contract payment transactions was for adjustments to 
previously recorded payments- $51 billion of adjustments 
out of $157 billion in transactions. [Ref. 7:p. 3]  GAO 
found that DOD contracts containing multiple fund citations 
and complex payment allocation terms were more likely to 
have payment errors.  This is because of the amount of 
manually entered data and the opportunities for errors.  
For example, on one reviewed case for closed contract 
adjustments, there were 548 different Accounting 
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Classification Reference Numbers (ACRN).  GAO also found 
the contract had been modified over 150 times and had 
received two complete contract reconciliations to correct 
payment problems, including one that produced 15,322 
accounting adjustments.  DOD now plans to complete a third 
reconciliation for this contract to correct about $3 
million of illegal and otherwise improper closed account 
adjustments.  It estimates that the reconciliation will 
take over 9,000 hours to complete. [Ref. 7:p. 3]   
DOD has made progress cutting down on the number of 
closed account adjustments.  Adjustments are deemed illegal 
when initial disbursements (1) occur after the 
appropriation being charged had already been canceled, (2) 
occur before the appropriation charged was enacted, or (3) 
were charged to the correct appropriation in the first 
place and no adjustment was necessary.  Also included are 
adjustments not sufficiently documented to establish they 
were proper. [Ref. 7:p. 5]   
For fiscal year 2000, DOD reversed $592 million of 
$615 million illegal or otherwise improper closed account 
adjustments involving forty-five contracts.  Thirty of 
those had additional accounting errors that required 
correction.  Because of the complexity of the contracts and 
the time it takes to complete a re-audit, officials at DFAS 
estimate that it would take over 21,000 hours to correct 
the accounting for the thirty contracts. [Ref. 7:p. 4] 
In July 2001, GAO recommended implementing controls to 
increase management oversight and apply renewed vigor to 
the 1990 account closing law, prohibiting adjustments.  In 
September 2001, DFAS upgraded the Contract Reconciliation 
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System (CRS) to identify and prevent illegal adjustments.  
This measure is geared to stop disbursement charges until 
an appropriation had been enacted.  A sample of fiscal year 
2001 closed appropriation account adjustments found $172 of 
$291 million (59 percent) were either illegal or otherwise 
improper; an improvement from 96 percent the previous year.   
Gregory Kutz of the GAO noted, ”Our review disclosed that 
CRS routinely processed billions of dollars of closed 
appropriations account adjustments without regard to the 
requirements of the 1990 account closing law.” [Ref. 7:p. 
5] 
Improvements have been significant.  During the first 
six months of fiscal year 2002, DOD reported making $200 
million of closed account adjustments—including only 
$253,000 of illegal adjustments—which was 80 percent less 
than the $1 billion of reported closed account adjustments 
made during the same six months of fiscal year 2001. [Ref. 
7:p. 3]  Therefore, Gregory Kutz concluded: 
The lack of fundamental controls and management 
oversight had fostered the idea among DOD 
contracting and accounting personnel that it was 
acceptable to maximize the use of available funds 
by adjusting the accounting records to use up the 
unspent funds in the closed accounts, regardless 
of the propriety of doing so. [Ref. 7:p. 3]  
9. Lure of Technological Solution 
A common theme to failed attempts for fixing the 
financial management structure at DOD has involved blanket 
allocations for Information Technology (IT) solutions.  
These non-comprehensive changes have achieved nothing more 
than perpetuating DOD’s stovepipe environment, and left no 
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noticeable improvements, while costing billions of dollars.  
As John Coyle said: 
You got to re-engineer, because if you throw 
technology at the problem, it doesn’t solve the 
problem.  Every company I’ve ever worked with 
that tried to throw technology at the problem 
have ended up costing themselves a lot of money.  
They got to start basic with the processes. [Ref. 
5:p. 23-24] 
In addition to restructuring the overall architecture, 
the piecemeal practice of disbursing IT money has not 
worked.  Gregory Kutz states: 
IT money is being shelled out all over the place 
within the department, and that is how you get 
the proliferation of systems and everybody 
building their own systems.  One thing Congress 
could do, which has been at a place like IRS, is 
to try to centralize that funding to get control 
over it. [Ref. 5:p. 27]   
He adds, “There are buckets of money all over the 
department that are being spent on IT improvements or 
upgrades that are not being controlled properly at this 
point.” [Ref. 2:p. 33]   
Lawrence Lanzillotta from the DOD Comptroller’s office 
cited a DOD study where it became apparent that trying to 
bring small piece IT fixes together, was not going to work.  
There has to be an overarching architecture or a plan for 
people to follow. [Ref. 2:p. 15]   
The composition of the Secretary of Defense’s advisory 
group has also come into question.  Instead of having 
members of the cutting edge of industry and technology, 
John Coyle points out, “The problem is that sometimes 
retirees like myself are appointed to those advisory groups 
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and some of them aren’t always up to date on the most 
modern technology.” [Ref. 5:p. 28]  This contributes to a 
dangerous path when there is focus on technological 
solutions.  Technology advances so rapidly, that when 
advisory groups recommend a solution, the system is 
outdated by the time it is implemented because of 
procurement practices. [Ref. 5:p. 31]   
10. Existing Regulations Impeding Reform 
DOD is hampered in its reform efforts by rules and 
regulations that are time consuming and restrictive.  While 
it is important for Congress to maintain spending controls, 
these checks and balances also provide little flexibility 
in executing the budget.  It is an unwritten rule amongst 
fleet supply officers that if they do not spend all of 
their allotted funds for the fiscal year, there is a high 
probability decision makers would take note and slash their 
budget.  This promotes a culture of waste as managers have 
an incentive to make potentially frivolous purchases 
instead of reallocating or reinvesting excess funds. 
Other legislation impeding a more efficient financial 
infrastructure include cumbersome appropriation accounting 
requirements, detailed record keeping and reporting 
mandates, and obstacles to private sector partnering in 
areas that are inherently commercial.  John Coyle concludes 
that government policy, “In effect, preclude some of the 
types of strategic acquisition practices that are going on 
in the private sector and allow a company like Dell to do 
the kind of things they do.” [Ref. 5:p. 29]  To enact 
significant reform, DOD must overcoming budget language and 
strict procurement regulations. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
DOD has many hurdles to overcome before a suitable 
financial management system can be successfully 
implemented.  Congress has a keen interest in DOD’s reform 
efforts and they will do everything in their power to 
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IV. CURRENT EVALUATION FROM GAO AND DOD  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The General Accounting Office is the investigative arm 
of the United States Congress and is charged with examining 
all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of 
public funds. They support Congress by performing a variety 
of services, the most prominent of which are audits and 
evaluations of Government programs and activities; the 
majority of these reviews are made in response to specific 
Congressional requests.  DOD operations have been under a 
microscope for several decades as Congress has tasked GAO 
with investigating their financial situation and making 
recommendations to achieve legal compliance.  For its part, 
DOD has conducted self-assessments to chart a course to 
improve financial management, including reaching an end 
state of a completely auditable business structure.    
B. GAO PERSPECTIVE 
The General Accounting Office has been encouraged by 
the recent direction exhibited by DOD as they attempt to 
reengineer their business practices.  They give credit to 
the department for spearheading numerous reform initiatives 
to improve key business processes in such areas as 
financial and information management, weapons system 
acquisitions, and logistics reengineering.  They observe 
that while these initiatives have produced positive 
results, many deficiencies remain to be corrected before 
the process is completed. 
1. Root Causes 
GAO concluded DOD’s financial management problems are 
“pervasive, complex, long-standing, and deeply rooted in 
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virtually all business operations.” [Ref. 8:p. 1]  Six of 
the twenty-two areas on GAO’s government wide “high-risk” 
list are DOD program areas, and DOD shares responsibility 
for two other high-risk areas that are government wide in 
scope. [Ref. 9]  Central to an effective reform strategy 
will be the understanding that these eight areas are 
interrelated and cannot be addressed in an isolated, stove-
piped, or piecemeal fashion. 
GAO observed that problems with the department’s 
financial management operations go far beyond its 
accounting systems and processes.  Gregory Kutz, GAO’s 
Director of Financial Management and Assurance, determined: 
The department continues to rely on a far flung, 
complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, 
acquisition, and other management information 
systems- 80 percent of which are not under the 
control of the DOD Comptroller- to gather the 
financial data needed to support day-to-day 
management decision making. [Ref. 8:p. 4]  
He concludes that the network has evolved into the overly 
complex and error-prone operation that exists today, 
characterized by: 
Little standardization across DOD components, 
multiple systems performing the same tasks, 
redundant data stored in multiple systems, manual 
data entry into independent systems, and a large 
number of data translations and interfaces that 
combine to exacerbate problems with data 
integrity. [Ref. 8:p. 4] 
2. Challenges and Proposed Strategy 
Gregory Kutz detailed what he and the GAO perceive as 
the underlying challenges hampering reform efforts of 
financial and related business processes.  These include: 
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• A lack of sustained top-level leadership and 
management accountability for correcting problems 
• A deeply embedded cultural resistance to change 
• Military service parochialism  
• Stove-piped operations 
• Lack of results-oriented goals  
• Inadequate performance measures and monitoring 
• Inconsequential incentives for seeking change 
[Ref. 8:p. 8] 
GAO has identified several key elements that they feel 
collectively would enable the department to effectively 
overcome the underlying causes of long-standing financial 
management problems.  Strategies include: 
• Address the department’s financial 
management challenges as part of a 
comprehensive, integrated, DOD-wide business 
process reform 
• Provide for sustained leadership by the 
Secretary of Defense and empowering the 
office with overarching resource control to 
jointly implement financial management 
reforms 
• Establish clear lines of responsibility, 
authority, and accountability to ensure 
single point accountability 
• Incorporating results-oriented performance 
measures and monitoring tied to financial 
management reforms 
• Enact appropriate incentives or consequences 
for action or inaction 
• Institute effective management controls 
[Ref. 8:p. 12]  
If implemented correctly, GAO’s recommendations would 
bring compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act, requiring 
agencies to leverage Information Technology investments to 
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develop, implement and maintain integrated system 
architecture. [Ref. 10]  With the proposed fiscal year 2003 
DOD Information Technology investment budget at $26 
billion, Gregory Kutz expressed GAO’s concern by stating, 
“Without an architecture, DOD risks spending billions of 
dollars to perpetuate the existing complex, stovepipe, high 
maintenance environment that exists today.” [Ref. 2:p. 26]   
3. Specific Recommendations 
GAO has made a number of specific recommendations to 
aid DOD’s reform efforts.  They include the need for DOD to 
simplify contract accounting and realize short-term savings 
by transitioning to electronic billing.  For example, a 
Navy Child Care Center submitted a $1,209 contract for 
children’s toys, candy, and holiday decorations written 
with most line items assigned separate Account 
Classification Reference Numbers (ACRN).  A separate 
requisition was generated for each item ordered, in total; 
the contract was assigned 46 ACRNs.  To record this payment 
against the one appropriation, DFAS manually allocated the 
payment to all 46 ACRNs. [Ref. 7:p. 7]  Significant savings 
could be realized with a reduction in man-hours if a 
concerted effort were made to fully transition to 
electronic contract accounting.   
There are also significant short-term challenges in 
correcting improper account adjustments.  While recent 
changes in contract writing procedures and additional 
policy requirements will help reduce errors that require 
subsequent correcting, GAO found that there are still 
thousands of older contracts in the Mechanization of 
Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) that have one or 
more closed accounts that need to be monitored closely to 
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ensure illegal or otherwise improper adjustments do not 
occur.  As of April 2002, a MOCAS inquiry showed there were 
15,421 active contracts valued at $519 billion for which at 
least one appropriation had been canceled. [Ref. 7:p. 8]    
4. GAO Prognosis 
The GAO recognizes the enormous challenge facing DOD 
and supports Secretary Rumsfeld in his eight to ten year 
estimation of completing the transformation.  They have 
expressed that critical to progress will be long-term 
actions focused on the Secretary’s envisioned business 
transformation and short-term actions concentrated on 
improvements within existing systems and processes.  
Gregory Kutz concludes: 
Short-term actions in particular will be critical 
if the department is to achieve the greatest 
possible accountability over existing resources 
and more reliable data for day-to-day decision 
making while longer-term system and business 
process reengineering efforts are under way.  
Beginning with the Secretary’s recognition of a 
need for a fundamental transformation of the 
department’s business processes, and building on 
some of the work begun under past 
administrations, DOD has taken a number of 
positive steps in many of these key areas. [Ref. 
8:p. 13]   
At the same time, the challenges remaining in each of 
these key areas are daunting. 
GAO has praised the re-initiation of the quarterly 
meetings of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the 
Office of Personnel Management and the Comptroller General 
called the Principals of the Joint Financial Management 
Improvement Program.  Beginning again in August 2001, this 
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marked the first time the four key officials had gathered 
together in 10 years.  Their purpose is to agree on 
measures to include in future systems to be able to 
routinely provide timely, reliable, and useful financial 
information.    Gregory Kutz notes, “To date, these 
sessions have resulted in substantive deliberations and 
agreements focused on key issues such as better defining 
measures for financial management success.” [Ref. 8]  The 
planned integration of the DOD Comptroller into these 
meetings is also a step in the right direction.     
GAO looks to the future by stating that they support 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision for transforming the 
department’s full range of business processes.  They 
believe substantial personal involvement by the Secretary 
and other DOD top executives will be essential to change 
the DOD culture that has over time perpetuated the status 
quo and been resistant to a transformation of the magnitude 
envisioned by the Secretary.  GAO also identifies the need 
for the DOD Comptroller, Dov Zakheim, as the Secretary’s 
leader for financial management modernization, to have the 
ability to make the tough choices on systems, processes, 
and personnel, and to control spending for the new systems 
across the department.  Processes will have to be 
reengineered, and hierarchical, process-oriented, stove-
piped, and internally focused approaches will have to be 
put aside.  As Gregory Kutz points out, “The past has 
taught us that well-intentioned initiatives will only 
succeed if there are the right incentives, transparency, 
and accountability mechanisms in place.” [Ref. 8:p. 22]  If 
DOD fails to sustain positive results, GAO may recommend 
that Congress take financial reform out of DOD’s control.  
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C. DOD PERSPECTIVE 
Although DOD’s financial situation appears dire, a 
feeling of hope and optimism is prevalent throughout the 
department that the new administration’s direction will 
result in effective and lasting change.  DOD strategy for a 
financial management solution is to reengineer their 
business processes and develop an overarching architecture 
to provide information needed to guide and account for 
management decisions.  As Lawrence Lanzillotta, Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Deputy Comptroller), 
states, “A well designed business management system will 
enable us to produce not only relevant management 
information but also auditable compliant financial 
statements.” [Ref. 2:p. 7]  With strong and committed 
leadership, willingness to invest in new architecture and 
the patience to see initiatives through, the department 
forecasts full compliance with the CFO Act within the 
decade.   
1. Feeling of Optimism with Current Leadership    
Even though DOD is faced with a mountain of problems, 
Robert Lieberman, the Deputy Inspector General for the 
Department of Defense, cites, “Secretary Rumsfeld is the 
first secretary in memory to state repeatedly that the 
financial management system is badly broken and needs to be 
fixed.  He has imparted the attitude that he expects it to 
be fixed and he is willing to spend money to fix it.” [Ref. 
2:p. 35]  An important aspect to successful change is 
acknowledging reality and eliminating skepticism from 
previously failed reform efforts.  Defense leaders are 
attempting to distinguish their strategy from those of the 
past in hopes of purging the cultural feeling of another 
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imminent half-hearted attempt.  Lawrence Lanzillotta 
believes the most important feature distinguishing this 
from past endeavors is this financial management reform is 
leadership driven.  He states, “This is a top-down effort.  
Past reforms were bottom up.  That was a piecemeal 
approach, which only yielded marginal change and were 
unable to achieve the needed cultural changes and the 
comprehensive solution.” [Ref. 2:p. 6]   
The presence of a powerful Secretary of Defense is a 
primary reason why optimism is prevalent throughout DOD.   
Donald Rumsfeld’s résumé brought instant credibility to the 
office and by virtue of previously holding the position in 
the Ford administration, eliminated the need for a 
significant turnover period.  Additionally, he has become 
very powerful on Capital Hill because of his recognized 
subject matter expertise and political savvy.  He has been 
lauded for his leadership on the War on Terror, and it can 
be argued he is the most influential Secretary of Defense 
in modern times.  Rumsfeld has also given every indication 
he plans to stay in office significantly longer than the 
1.7 years for the average political appointee.  In an 
interview he gave on the one-year anniversary of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks he said: 
I spend most of my waking hours working here (at 
the Pentagon) and thinking about the problems of 
the country and the tasks the department faces 
and you can't help but think when you think about 
September 11th, the people who died and their 
families, and be energized by the importance of 
what we're doing and the importance of our doing 
it well for the people who are alive and the 
people who are in uniform, putting their lives at 
risk. [Ref. 11] 
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2. New Commitment for Reform 
The Secretary’s actions have also shown commitment to 
improving the financial structure.  Because of a 1998 
Congressional requirement, DOD began providing a financial 
management improvement plan to Congress.  However, the plan 
did not include an integrated assessment for system 
reengineering requirements and a flat cost statement to 
achieve CFO Act compliance.  Secretary Rumsfeld lobbied to 
place almost $100 million in the Fiscal Year 03 budget to 
step back and create a blueprint for new financial 
management architecture.  Robert Lieberman thinks this is 
significant because, “It shows the department is forcing 
itself to face reality, and this is the first time any 
large, visible chunk of money has gone into a DOD budget 
for a financial management improvement.” [Ref. 2:p: 35] 
3. Time Table Until Completion 
DOD believes the eight to ten year estimate to achieve 
an unqualified opinion audit is a reasonable time frame.  
When asked by Representative Kucinich why it will take so 
long, Lawrence Lanzillotta replied, “Do we hope to do it 
faster?  Yes.  Some of the criticism we’ve taken is that 
our plan is actually too aggressive.” [Ref. 2:p. 9]  In 
April 2002, DOD officials began tackling the financial mess 
by hiring IBM under a $100 million blanket purchasing 
agreement. The contract calls for the development of a plan 
to merge all DOD business systems that contain financial 
data into an agency-wide network.  The network is 
envisioned to deal with what Lanzillotta calls the root of 
DOD’s problem: “The uncontrolled proliferation of 
antiquated and standalone financial management systems and 
the inefficient business processes that they support. [Ref. 
  56 
1:p. 2] Once the department approves IBM’s strategy, an 
architecture and transition plan will be developed over the 
next year.  IBM will then launch a proof-of-concept effort 
to validate the architecture.  Catherine Santana, acting 
financial management modernization program manager, said: 
Defense-wide implementation would begin by 2005, 
but the entire rollout will take up to six years.  
The network could combine current systems and new 
technology and emerging technology will be part 
of the system so it will remain current and be 
adaptable. [Ref. 12:p. 1]  
Congress sees these estimates as reasonable because of the 
example of companies such as Gillette.  Small in scope 
compared to DOD with a less complex financial structure, 
Gillette completed their financial reform in four years.    
4. Influx of Skilled Personnel 
Secretary Rumsfeld has also emphasized having the best 
people dedicated to oversee financial reform.  Drawing on 
his private sector experience and the expertise of his key 
advisors, Rumsfeld has put together a team to create a 
world-class business structure.  Lawrence Lanzillotta 
promotes one of the benefits of the new staff additions by 
stating, “The influx of cutting edge civilian leadership 
has also established a direct link to private industry.” 
[Ref. 2:p. 7]  Another significant step is the creation of 
the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Financial Reform.  This is part of a reorganization and 
realignment of the Comptroller’s office to direct assets 
totally devoted to the problem.  Lawrence Lanzillotta 
echoes the view of the department by stating, “Besides 
being leadership driven, it would also distinguish our 
reform as a comprehensive centerpiece of defense wide 
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architecture, seamlessly linking our reengineered business 
practices and our financial information system.” [Ref. 2:p. 
7]       
Although DOD does not have a stellar track record 
implementing change, the department got the job done facing 
the Y2K crisis.  They brought in technical experts and 
Stephen Friedman observed, “It [Y2K] had a high priority, 
people were brought together and there was a centralized 
decision making that there couldn’t be leniency about your 
way of doing it.” [Ref. 2:p. 18]  Therefore, the precedence 
has been set that if the right specialists are incorporated 
and there is an understanding of the importance of a 
problem, the work can get done no matter the difficulty of 
the task.   
5. DOD’s Perspective on Congressional Oversight 
When asked by Representative Tierney what Congress 
could do to provide an incentive, Robert Lieberman, DOD’s 
Deputy Inspector General, responded: 
I would think, sir, that Congress should insist 
on very explicit milestones.  Get back to this 
idea of what is the road map and does everybody 
understand whether progress has been made or not.  
And the release of money can be tied to these 
milestones.  Right now, the problem has been this 
myriad of systems, many of which have money being 
spent on them right now, to modernize them or 
change them or replace them.  There’s inadequate 
visibility to the Congress in terms of which of 
these are making progress and which aren’t.  And 
even though some of these projects are reviewed 
in depth, by various congressional committees, 
it’s not in the context of the overall financial 
management improvement plan. [Ref. 2:p. 32-33]   
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Based on past events, if there is no sustained interest 
from Congress; the probability of a drop in interest from 
DOD dramatically increases.     
6. Short Term Specific Solutions 
a. Inventory Control 
Addressing shortcomings in inventory control 
procedures, DOD is attempting to implement changes similar 
to the successful programs implemented by Wal-Mart and 
Sears.  These civilian companies utilize revolutionary 
automated systems to track inventory, ordering, and 
shipping at near real time for all locations.  DOD has 
planned a pilot program for JSList that will employ 
traditional barcodes, radio frequency identification 
tagging, scanners and readers to track the garments from 
stocks in Albany, Georgia to the receiving unit.  5,000 
suits will be tagged for the pilot effort and arranged for 
units in the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina to receive them.  The goal is to track the 
suit movements at several commands simultaneously to 
validate near real time visibility.  Collaterally, attempts 
will be made to compile information to a central database 
so that the Defense Logistics Agency, the Program Office, 
and individual services will be able to track JSList from 
the manufacturer through DLA, via the services, and 
ultimately at operating units in real time. [Ref. 5:p. 33]  
The Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Supply 
Center Philadelphia have also embarked on a plan to replace 
the standard automated material management system with a 
state-of-the-art system called Business Systems 
Modernization.  Douglas Bryce, Program Manager for JSList, 
states, “This system is expected to be user friendly, 
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flexible, and fully implemented by fiscal year 2005.” [Ref. 
5:p. 34]  This will allow more accurate tracking of the 
Defense Logistics Agency’s inventory. 
b. Automated Bill Paying 
DOD is also making progress towards fixing bill 
payment inefficiencies.  DFAS has spearheaded the 
initiative to leverage commercial, Internet-based 
technology and streamline the bill paying process.  As a 
result, credit card officials now have an online capability 
to set up, revise and cancel card accounts, and to review 
credit card transactions as they post to bank systems.  
Officials also have the capability to review, approve or 
dispute transactions without waiting the 30 days for paper 
statements to be received.  Bruce Sullivan, Director of the 
Joint Purchase Card Program Office, cites:  
DFAS has done an outstanding job of mapping its 
systems to accommodate these electronic invoices 
and has lowered its rate it charges its DOD 
component customers for billing services by as 
much as 60 percent, a real incentive for the 
components to use the online process. [Ref. 5:p. 
35] 
Significant improvements have been made.  Currently, over 
50 percent of the Navy’s invoices and about 80 percent of 
the Army and Air Force’s bills are paid with this process. 
[Ref. 5:p. 35]  DOD is on its way to achieving its goal of 
complete elimination of paper credit card processing.  
An additional bonus is the system is moving away 
from reliance on the postal service.  The ability to review 
transactions had been limited to the end of the billing 
cycle, when paper statements were received by the 
cardholders and approving officials.  Any mail delays, such 
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as those in the wake of the anthrax threat, could 
accumulate interest charges as the weeks are added between 
the time an invoice is sent and the originator receives 
payment. [Ref. 5:p. 35]        
c. Internal Controls 
DOD also recognizes the potential benefits of the 
internal controls the Internet can provide.  A cardholder’s 
statement can be placed on a secured Internet site, 
allowing participants to look at their statement at their 
discretion throughout the billing cycle.  As Bruce Sullivan 
states: 
A customer can find out if their card number has 
been compromised before getting a monthly 
statement.  Not only can the cardholder account 
for transactions, but also his supervisor or the 
approving official can monitor card usage and 
provide a deterrent against unauthorized 
purchases.  In addition, the program official 
providing oversight can perform the same 
function. [Ref. 5:p. 43]    
Technology has significantly enhanced DOD’s ability to 
accurately account for credit card usage. 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
GAO and DOD both seem to agree on the root causes of 
the current financial crisis in the defense department, and 
more importantly, they seem to have a clear focus of the 
steps needed to emerge with a modern business system that 
possesses the flexibility to modernize and stay current.  
The easy part of the equation is reaching a consensus and 
the hard part is implementing an effective solution.  DOD 
has many obstacles to overcome for current reform plans to 
not work, starting with the top 10 list in Chapter III. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Improving financial management at the Department of 
Defense is an enormous task.  Compounding this challenge is 
DOD leadership’s immediate priority of winning the 
worldwide war against terrorism, while concurrently 
transforming business architecture and systems for the 21st 
century.  As explained in Chapter II, DOD budget 
formulation and execution is difficult business.  This 
point was illustrated by the sampling of individual Navy 
accounts from the Military Personnel, Operations and 
Maintenance, and Shipbuilding and Conversion 
appropriations.  Chapter III described Congressional 
concerns; the attempts made recently to remedy the 
financial management system, and described the Top 10 
environmental factors DOD must address before implementing 
a suitable framework.  Subsequently, Chapter IV explored 
GAO’s assessment of the root causes contributing to DOD’s 
problems and their recommended courses of action.  DOD’s 
self-assessment followed, accompanied by reform initiatives 
and their own outlook for plans succeeding.       
This chapter will draw general conclusions of the 
feasibility of proposed solutions from the analysis 
conducted during this research.  Finally, it will answer 
the research questions listed in Chapter I and will suggest 
areas of further study associated with this thesis. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
As discussed in Chapter III, DOD faces a myriad of 
challenges on the road to a modern financial management 
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system.  Table 4 below recaps the Top 10 issues, assigns a 
value based on the difficulty to achieve a solution with 
the current strategy, and identifies the primary issue to 




Prob to 5- 
High Prob) 
Commentary 




2 As mentioned in Chapter 
III, DOD must transform the 
current 1,127 financial 
systems and 3,500 
interfaces into an 
integrated architecture.  
The developmental contract 
with IBM detailed in 
Chapter IV has merit, 
however, other initiatives 
have looked promising in 
the past, only to be 
abandoned.  Early success 
will be the key element to 
building and sustaining 
momentum for reform.   
2- Transient Nature 
of DOD Leadership 
2 From Chapters III and IV, 
both GAO and DOD recognize 
the importance of a program 
champion when enacting 
significant change. 
Unfortunately, there is 
little likelihood of the 
political appointee process 
changing in the near 
future; therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume the 
tenure of leadership will 
continue to average the 
current 1.7 years.    




3 Discussed in Chapter III, 
DOD has neither positive 
nor negative repercussions 
tied to performance. With 
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the nation fighting a war, 
Congress would not impose a 
monetary penalty on DOD for 
failure to reach a 
financial management 
standard, but it is a 
possibility to explore in 
the future.  Additionally, 
personal accountability 
could improve if barriers 
were eased to fire poor 
performing government 




2 Chapter III gave examples 
of the culture of DOD being 
unreceptive to change.  
Altering the environment to 
be trigger a receptiveness 
to sweeping financial 
change is tied directly to 
the events in issues 1 and 
2, the early success of 
reform efforts and 
leadership involvement.  
Without those two elements, 
it is probable DOD’s 
culture will continue to do 
the minimum to get by until 
the system returns to the 
status quo.    
5- Low Ball Gaming 
Strategy 
3 As summarized in Chapter 
III, the gaming strategy of 
the defense industry has a 
ripple effect throughout 
DOD.  Contractors underbid 
to compete for contracts 
knowing DOD has set a 
precedent for bailing out 
companies as costs 
exponentially increase.  As 
contract costs escalate, 
planned production numbers 
are reduced, increasing 
maintenance costs for an 
aging force structure, as 
the fleet incorporates 
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progressively more complex 
and expensive systems.  
Congress and the Pentagon 
have the opportunity to end 
the low ball gaming 
strategy if they strictly 
enforce the terms of 
contracts, which would 
enable more accurate 
budgeting.  This must be 
done carefully to not 
alienate defense-oriented 
corporations because 
competition also remains an 
important part of the 
process.  




4 From Chapters III and IV, 
although DOD dwarfs the 
largest civilian companies 
in scale, the influx of 
corporate leadership is a 
positive step to be able to 
emulate influential 
companies and move away 
from antiquated business 




4 Described in Chapters III 
and IV, DOD has great 
potential to fix their 
inventory control problems. 
Taking advantage of new 
practices and technology 
such as radio frequency 
tags used by Wal-Mart and 
Sears can remedy the 
inventory visibility 
problem.  DOD has 
demonstrated it can 
accurately account for 
items such as weapons, now 
they need to apply the same 
vigor to all procurements. 




4 Discussed in Chapters III 
and IV, inaccurate payments 
and closed account 
adjustments cost DOD 
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millions of dollars and 
countless man-hours per 
year.  On a positive note, 
the 80 percent improvement 
in closed account 
adjustments for the first 
six months of fiscal year 
2002 is evidence progress 
can be made and more can be 
done. The critical element 
will be to ensure strict 
rules governing adjustments 
are enforced to prevent the 
current backlog of accounts 
requiring reconciliation 
from increasing.    
9- Lure of 
Technological 
Solution 
4 From Chapters III and IV, 
after years of piecemeal IT 
solutions, DOD has started 
to dedicate resources 
specifically to a 
comprehensive reengineering 





3 From Chapter III, it is in 
the best interest of 
Congress to do everything 
in their power to aid DOD’s 
efforts.  Passing 
legislation easing 
accounting requirements and 
providing more authority 
for DOD leaders could help 
transformation efforts. 
 
Table 4.   Top 10 Issue Assessment 
 
The current initiatives to improve DOD’s financial 
management situation have great potential.  The prognosis 
is favorable because of dynamic leadership and a strategy 
based on proven methods that have been effective for the 
private sector.  The critical element to sustaining 
progress over the estimated eight to ten year period is 
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early success and meeting planned milestones.  The entire 
reengineering effort could be in danger of dissolution if 
the program fails to reach scheduled waypoints and causes 
despondency throughout the department.   
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the primary financial management and 
budget execution problems facing DOD as seen by 
Congress and by DOD self-study?  
As described in Chapter III, Congress is particularly 
concerned about DOD’s financial management situation 
because defense accounts for 48% of the federal 
government’s discretionary spending and they are not able 
to complete an audit.  DOD is disturbed because the system 
does not provide relevant and timely information to 
decision makers.  Congress and DOD have identified the   
primary financial management and budget execution problems 
facing DOD as: the complexity of the current financial 
management structure, the transient nature of DOD 
leadership, the lack of consequences, incentives and 
rewards, a cultural resistance to change, a low ball gaming 
strategy of contractors, an inability to benchmark off 
successful companies, inadequate inventory control 
procedures, a lack of fundamental controls/inaccurate 
payments, a lure of technological solution, and existing 
regulations impeding reform. 
• How does DOD explain the persistence of these 
problems? 
As detailed in Chapter IV, DOD determined shortfalls 
with previous reform efforts existed in a lack of sustained 
leadership, failure to transform the organization’s culture 
to commit fully to transformation, a piecemeal solution 
instead of reengineering the entire system architecture, 
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and the people leading change did not possess significant 
experience in reform.  
• Is there a correlation in budget execution 
turbulence between various categories? 
Data from Chapter II, comparing the Navy’s budget 
figures with execution levels from three different 
categories reveal that although accounts such as Military 
Personnel display distinguishable patterns, turbulence 
still exists, but not to the extent of a new shipbuilding 
program like the LPD 17.  There is turbulence throughout 
the budget, but small correlation between categories.   
• What strategy does GAO recommend to correct 
problems with the DOD’s financial management 
system? 
As described in Chapter IV, GAO’s recommended strategy 
to DOD involves: creating a comprehensive and integrated, 
DOD-wide financial structure, providing DOD leadership with 
overarching resource control to jointly implement reforms, 
create single point accountability, establishing results 
oriented performance measures, and enacting appropriate 
incentives or consequences for results.  
• What is the probability that DOD’s reform plan 
will succeed? 
From Chapter IV, both GAO and DOD are optimistic about 
the course of action succeeding.  Much will depend on the 
progress made in the IBM contract and if the milestone of 
2005 for defense-wide implementation is met.  If DOD can 
instill the urgency within the organization similar to the 
Y2K situation, probability is high for a worthwhile 
financial management system coming to fruition.   
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• What types of incentives, penalties or rewards 
can Congress impose to help sustain DOD’s 
efforts?  
As mentioned in Chapters III and IV, prescribing the 
proper incentives, penalties and rewards could provide the 
motivation DOD needs to push reform efforts through to a 
final product.  Congress could hold Secretary Rumsfeld to 
his word that transformation efforts will yield a savings 
of between $15 to $18 billion dollars a year, by adding 
incentives and penalties to future year budgets for not 
reaching certain thresholds.  In addition, easing 
restrictions on firing government workers could provide 
enough job insecurity to be the catalyst the department has 
lacked to get the most out of its employees.      
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Track the Progress of Reform Initiatives 
This research would chart the headway current 
initiatives have made toward reaching the goal of an 
auditable financial structure for the Department of Defense 
sometime between the years 2010 and 2012.  Research on this 
topic should include an assessment of where DOD stands in 
relation to planned milestones, programs added or 
abandoned, and a re-estimated date to attain full financial 
compliance. 
2.  DOD Inventory Control and Visibility 
Of major concern to Congress is a perceived 
lackadaisical approach to inventory control in DOD.  This 
research would analyze the results of the JSList protective 
garment pilot program with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary 
Force at Camp Lejeune, and identification of other strides 
made in the field of DOD inventory management.  Special 
emphasis should be paid to technological innovations, 
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satisfying Congressional concerns, and if DOD is able to 
meet its goal of full inventory visibility from 
headquarters to the unit level.  
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